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abstract: Hayek’s late work on liberal politics is characterized by the idea that free 
market represents the best way of not only economic, but also political coordina-
tion . Epistemic liberalism builds upon this idea, reasserting old and highlighting new 
arguments to demonstrate the epistemic advantages of free market over deliberative 
democracy . This paper discusses the theoretical roots of epistemic liberalism, presents 
its key arguments but also addresses some important distinctions that part epistemic 
liberalism from epistemic democracy .
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Epistemic justification of collective decision-making procedures has been 
growing in approval for the past ten years . The idea that democracy has some 
epistemic qualities has been around since Aristotle (1984), but the recent rise 
of epistemic democracy is mostly the result of the work of post-Rawlsian phi-
losophers such as David Estlund, Fabienne Peter, Helene Landermore, Robert 
Talisse and many others . Though they disagree on numerous issues, including 
the very justification of the democratic legitimacy, these philosophers end up 
endorsing some form of egalitarian deliberative democracy . This paper aims to 
analyze and present an alternative approach, one that has often been neglected 
in discussions on the epistemic justification of decision-making procedures .
Epistemic liberalism, which stems mostly from Hayek’s late work on 
liberal politics, builds on the idea that free market combined with small and 
neutral liberal state represents an epistemically superior institutional arrange-
ment to epistocratic government and central planning, but also to egalitarian 
deliberative democracy characterized by large state and complex decision-ma-
king procedures . Holding that the knowledge relevant for settling many poli-
tical issues is widely dispersed throughout the political community, epistemic 
* Corrigendum: In this article, the overview of epistemic liberalism (pp . 83-89), the re-
ference to the campfire analogy (p . 87), and the discussion of the concept of “legal silence” 
(p . 92) are based on Adam James Tebble’s book Epistemic Liberalism: A defence (2016) . This 
footnote is inserted on February 10th 2020 in the online published version of the article .
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liberals believe that free market and minimal (democratic) government re-
present epistemically the best arrangement for making use of this knowledge . 
This paper aims to present the central argument used by epistemic liberals, 
but also to review a few objections that epistemic liberals raise against the 
dominant conception of epistemic democracy .
First part of the paper sets the general outline of epistemic political ju-
stification and distinguishes it from political justification based on moral va-
lues . Second part briefly addresses the work of some key philosophers who 
have set foundations of epistemic liberalism, including John Stuart Mill, Karl 
Popper, Karl Polanyi and Friedrich Hayek . Third part of the paper addresses 
the society’s knowledge problem: the knowledge relevant for resolving many 
political and economic issues is widely dispersed among the citizens within 
a political community, while large societies we live in are complex in na-
ture . Epistemic liberals hold that free market represents the epistemically best 
arrangement for addressing the society’s knowledge problem . Fourth part of 
the paper identifies epistemic liberalism as a purely procedural position, one 
that does not appeal to any substantial procedure-independent standard to 
evaluate the epistemic quality of an institutional arrangement or a decision-
making procedure, while the fifth part elaborates the claim that free market 
is epistemically superior to collective deliberation . Some concluding remarks 
are discussed in the final part of the paper .
Epistemic Justification
How can we identify and publicly justify the proper terms of political associa-
tion in a society characterized by the pluralism of comprehensive moral doc-
trines? Many political philosophers have addressed this challenge, which has 
been growing in relevance since Rawls (1993) shifted the debate from justice 
of terms of political association to their legitimacy in the 1990s . The content 
of political decisions thus ceases to be the central question – in a plural soci-
ety we cannot expect that citizens, embracing different comprehensive doc-
trines, will agree on a substantive justification of many laws, public policies 
and political decisions . Political philosophers thus focus not on the substan-
tive justification of a particular output of a political decision-making proc-
ess, but instead on the justification of the terms of political association that 
constitute that particular political decision-making process . The end results 
(or outputs) of such processes are then procedurally (and not substantively) 
justified – their legitimacy stems from the legitimacy-generating potential of 
the decision-making procedure that has produced them1 .
1 For the detailed account of substantive and procedural justification see Peter (2011, 2012) .
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A new problem arises when we try to identify and publicly justify the 
proper decision-making procedure (or the proper terms of political associa-
tion) that has legitimacy-generating potential . How can we find a public jus-
tification of any particular set of terms of political association that all citizens, 
holding different and often incompatible moral comprehensive doctrines, 
can endorse? Trying to found the justification in some moral comprehensive 
doctrine, like Dworkin’s (2006) attempt to justify democratic system by ap-
pealing to a moral and universally accepted conception of human dignity, 
seems futile since, in a plural society, there will always be some (reasonable) 
citizens who will find the justification contestable . An alternative is to offer 
a freestanding, ‘political, not metaphysical’ (Rawls 1985) justification of a 
liberal democratic system, one in which citizens who adopt different com-
prehensive moral doctrines still endorse the same conception of justice . This 
account is criticized by authors who believe that such project is nonetheless 
grounded in some moral commitments . Talisse thus claims that Rawls has 
offered a moral commitment that is “minimal enough to be acceptable across 
otherwise deeply divided citizens, but nevertheless substantial enough to sup-
port democratic commitments” (2009a: 78) .
Finding a moral justification of terms of political association (and of de-
cision-making procedures) in conditions of reasonable moral pluralism thus 
seems to be deeply problematic . An alternative approach is to avoid moral 
considerations and to put forward an epistemic justification, i .e . to present 
how some aspects of a political association contribute to (or embody) some 
epistemic (and not moral) values . Provided that these epistemic values can 
be endorsed by all reasonable2 citizens, we might be able to make a public 
justification of a collective decision-making procedure .
Epistemic Liberalism
Epistemic liberalism, as indicated in the earlier paragraph, does not use moral 
arguments to justify certain terms of political association or a particular deci-
sion-making procedure . It instead focuses on the preconditions needed for 
the efficient use of knowledge in large and complex systems . It is not con-
cerned with particular decisions or policies, but instead tries to find the ap-
2 Robert Talisse (2009a, 2009b) usefully distinguishes between the moral notion of rea-
sonableness, put forward by John Rawls (1971, 1993), where reasonable citizens are defined as 
those who embrace some (minimal) moral norms (e .g . they want to live in a society in which 
they can cooperate with their fellow citizens on terms that are acceptable to all), and the epi-
stemic notion of reasonableness, where reasonable citizens are defined as those who endorse 
some (minimal) epistemic norms and duties (e .g . they accept only beliefs that are supported 
by evidence and good arguments and they are ready and willing to revise their original beliefs 
in the light of better arguments) . 
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propriate institutions and procedures needed for the most efficient use of 
knowledge . Epistemic liberalism evaluates different institutions and proce-
dures according to a clear epistemic criterion, i .e . according to their ability to 
use the existing knowledge within a system and to utilize it to make decisions 
and policies of considerable epistemic quality .
Similar ideas have been discussed and embraced by many influential 
western philosophers in the 19th and the 20th century . Mill’s (2008) instru-
mental arguments for the freedom of expression clearly point out that he held 
it to be a valuable epistemic tool . If we, as a political (but also as an epistemic) 
community, want our decisions (both individual and collective) and policies 
to be as correct as possible, we should defend freedom of speech and freedom 
of expression . Mill held that freedoms of thought, speech, press and expres-
sion contribute to the wider process of social learning, making citizens better 
epistemic (and moral) agents, but also helping us make better collective deci-
sions3 (Mill 1977) .
We can find similar arguments in Popper’s later work: having drawn the 
analogy between science and politics, Popper concludes that in politics we 
are also engaged in the process of falsification where we reject bad political 
decisions and policies . In order to be able to conduct this process we need an 
open (liberal) society in which citizens can freely criticize the government, 
but also influence the future decisions and policies through an election proc-
ess4 (Popper 1980) . Open society has an epistemic value – freedoms and lib-
erties that constitute it enable us to engage in the process of falsification, and 
to utilize the knowledge within a political community to produce collective 
decisions of substantial epistemic quality .
Finally, Polanyi (1974) stressed these ideas further by drawing a parallel 
between the market economy and the process of acquiring knowledge . He 
strongly opposed the system in which a small minority of experts defines the 
goals for future scientific inquiries (and the distribution of resources needed 
to finance these inquiries), and opted for an idea of polycentricity, where 
scientists are free to decide what they want to focus their research upon, i .e . 
what they find to be the best means for getting to important scientific truths 
(Polanyi 1998) . The three philosophers discussed above share an important 
idea: they all believe that we can justify a particular set of terms of political as-
sociation by appealing to their ability to ensure the efficient use of the widely 
dispersed knowledge in a large and complex system .
3 Epistemic interpretation of Mill’s central argument for representative governemnt can 
be found in Estlund (2003), but also in Cerovac (2016a) and Peter (2011) .
4 Interestingly, Popper believes that an open society is not characterized only by the 
freedom of speech, press and associtation, along with free and fair elections, but also by free 
market and a set of economic liberties (Tebble 2016) . 
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The greatest source of inspiration for modern epistemic liberalism is, 
without much doubt, Hayek’s late work on liberal politics . He focuses on 
the society’s knowledge problem (Hayek 1987) and tries to answer how can 
large and complex societies harvest and organize the knowledge that is dis-
persed within a political community, with every citizen holding just a small 
fraction of the knowledge . A decision-making procedure that can best solve 
the knowledge problem and make use the fragmented knowledge that exists 
within a political community to produce good political decisions and policies 
is the one with legitimacy-generating potential . Before we can present and 
analyze Hayek’s solution to the society’s knowledge problem, we should first 
examine two important ideas regarding the nature of a society we live in, but 
also the nature of our economic (and political) knowledge .
The Knowledge Problem
Some authors (Gray 1998, Sunstein 2006) hold that Hayek is focused exclu-
sively on economic distribution and does not address contemporary politics, 
characterized by the conflict of moral and cultural values . Similar criticism is 
raised by Habermas (1996), who usefully stresses that, in the last few decades, 
the focus has shifted from the issues of resource distribution to ‘the grammar 
of forms of life’ . Some therefore hold that Hayek’s innovative contribution 
was in defending free market from central planning economy, and though 
we might consider this defense successful (since central planning has been 
abandoned in most countries), this is as far as his contribution goes .
Contemporary supporters of epistemic liberalism (Tebble 2016, Lewis 
2013, Anderson 2006, but also Zubčić 2017) believe that Hayek’s later work 
can be of great help in addressing the problems of ‘the grammar of forms of 
life’ . Hayek thus re-enters the discussion with the society’s knowledge prob-
lem (Hayek 2012a, 2012b) . Since the relevant knowledge needed for political 
decision-making is not integrated and cannot be held by a small group of 
people, but is instead widely dispersed among the population in small, often 
inconsistent parts, we need to find proper terms of political association (but 
also a decision-making procedure) that will allow us to harness this knowl-
edge and use it to make good political decisions and to achieve good politi-
cal, economic and epistemic results . There are two key reasons why a small 
group of people (e .g . central planners) cannot make use of this dispersed 
knowledge: (i) economic knowledge is subjective in nature, making it impos-
sible for any individual to have all the relevant knowledge, and (ii) we live in 
complex societies, where our future actions (but also our beliefs on what is an 
appropriate future action) depend on actions of unseen and unknown others, 
who are also members of our society .
86 Prolegomena 17 (1) 2018
(i) Subjectivity of Economic Knowledge
For most economic cases the quality of a decision is determined not by its 
proximity to some objective and independent truth, but by beliefs and actions 
of other members of a society . The demand for some resource (and whether 
it will be considered a resource at all) is, for example, determined by subjec-
tive and often mistaken beliefs of other people, and not by its objective and 
independent value . In fact, it makes little sense to talk about objective and in-
dependent values of most resources – if most people consider some resource 
desirable and are willing to part from some other resource to acquire it, the 
first resource will be considered valuable and its price will be increased . This 
is the first feature that constitutes the subjectivity of economic knowledge 
– unlike religion or science, where we can find (at least to a certain degree) 
absolute answers, for many important questions in economy there are simply 
no objective and independent answers, since the result is often influenced 
or even shaped by subjective beliefs of other people . This also makes central 
planning a very unreliable economic decision-making procedure: even if a 
small group of people can have a solid understanding of subjective beliefs of 
other people, this knowledge is only temporary and provisional since people’s 
beliefs can be changed in a very short time .
The economic knowledge is also held in the conditions of isolation . The 
relevant knowledge is widely dispersed among the population, with every 
individual holding just a small fraction5 . Therefore, no individual or a small 
group of people can have all the relevant economic knowledge . Most of this 
knowledge cannot be transferred or shared between individuals since they 
live in complex societies and have no direct contact with most other members 
of a society (Hayek 2012b, Tebble 2016) .
Finally, the relevant economic knowledge is not only held individually, 
but also held tacitly . Many preferences, values or obligations need not be 
clearly articulated in order to influence one’s economic decision-making . 
Furthermore, sometimes the relevant knowledge lacks the discursive (or 
propositional) form and cannot be transferred to others, even if both parties 
want to do so .
The subjective nature of economic knowledge leads Hayek to conclude 
that we need terms of political association that can accommodate the wide 
dispersal of economic knowledge, its temporary nature as well as its non-
transferability among individuals . All forms of economic epistocracy, the rule 
of those who are considered experts in economics (e .g . central planners), will 
5 Similar ideas are held by Fabienne Peter, who takes a more egalitarian and procedure-
oriented approach by using the recenet discussions on peer disagreement to account for the 
wide dispersion of knowledge within a community . See Peter (2012, 2015)
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not be able to accommodate the three abovementioned circumstances of eco-
nomic knowledge . We should therefore look for other models of political 
association, those that promote extensive economic and political liberties, 
together with democratic decision-making procedures .
(ii) Complex Societies
We live in societies where the success of our individual (economic or politi-
cal) plans depends greatly on the individual plans of many other members . 
Whether a certain resource will be available to us depends on whether oth-
ers desire the same resource: sometimes the more people desire the same re-
source, the less likely it is that we shall receive it (e .g . food, oil or land), while 
sometimes the more people desire it, the more likely it is that we shall receive 
it (e .g . having a play performed in the language of national minority at the 
theatre) . In any case, whether our economic or political action will be a pru-
dent one depends greatly upon the actions of others . Knowing what other 
members of a society want or intend to do is thus extremely important for 
deciding what our next action will be . This is why Hayek (2012a: 38) writes 
that ‘one person’s actions are other person’s data’ . If we want to undertake a 
reasonable economic or political action, we should have the relevant knowl-
edge on the actions of others, i .e . we should be able to predict how the others 
will act .
The method by which we can get this relevant knowledge depends on 
the size of the society in question, as well as on the nature of social relations 
within it . In a small, face-to-face society, where all the members can gather at 
a certain place (e .g . around the camp fire or on the town square), discuss the 
issues at hand and share their knowledge in the real-time, due to direct na-
ture of social relations public deliberation might be the appropriate decision-
making procedure6 . However, contemporary societies do not even remotely 
resemble tribal communities or ancient poleis, and we cannot use decision-
making procedures appropriate for such small societies to regulate the terms 
of political association appropriate for societies we live in .
Hayek characterizes the societies we live in as complex societies . The plans 
and future actions are determined simultaneously but independently by a 
number of persons, who (because of the huge size of such societies) are not 
in direct contact with one another . Since they cannot communicate with one 
another, they are unaware of others’ subjective knowledge and motivating 
beliefs . This, of course, does not imply that their actions are not economically 
co-dependent . Each individual’s plans for future actions are dependent upon 
6 There are other flaws that epistemic liberals ascribe to public deliberation that are not 
addressed in this part of the paper, but are instead discussed in later parts, where free market is 
argued to have greater epistemic qualities than public deliberation . 
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the subjective and motivating knowledge of other, mutually unseen and un-
known individuals, provided that the consequences of others’ actions impact 
what one thinks ought to be done (Hayek 2012b, Tebble 2016) .
Epistemic liberals hold that political philosophy must find the appropri-
ate terms of political association and the appropriate decision-making pro-
cedures that will enable the best use of economic and political knowledge 
within a society, taking into considerations two troublesome facts: first, that 
the relevant knowledge is widely dispersed throughout the society, with each 
individual holding only a small portion of the overall knowledge, and second, 
that the contemporary society is complex in nature and its members are not 
in the direct contact with one another, thus being unaware of others’ subjec-
tive knowledge and motivating beliefs .
Instrumental vs. Procedural Epistemic Value
We have thus far established that epistemic liberalism searches for the epis-
temically best decision-making procedure (or terms of political association) 
for a complex society characterized by wide dispersal of relevant knowledge . 
But what kind of epistemic qualities does a decision-making procedure have 
to have? Defenders of epistemic justification of political legitimacy usually 
distinguish between instrumental and procedural epistemic value . A deci-
sion-making procedure has instrumental epistemic value if it represents a 
good means for reaching an epistemically desired end, i .e . if it helps us pro-
duce correct or true political decisions . A procedure has intrinsic epistemic 
value if it embodies or promotes certain intrinsic (or procedural) epistemic 
values (e .g . tolerance, epistemic equality, mutual accountability of epistemic 
peers)7 .
Epistemic democrats usually focus on procedure’s instrumental epistemic 
value (Estlund 2008, Landermore 2013), with Fabienne Peter’s (2011) earlier 
work on political legitimacy being a notable exception . Epistemic liberals, 
on the other hand, reject the idea of a procedure-independent instrumental 
epistemic value . There is no procedure-independent criterion in virtue of 
which the performance of a decision-making procedure may be evaluated . 
To suggest that there is such a criterion would be to beg the question that 
the knowledge problem rises (Hayek 2002) . namely, to suggest that there 
is some ideal end-state that all decision-making procedures try to produce, 
with some doing it better than others, and to suggest that we know what 
7 The distinction between instrumental and procedural epistemic value is discussed in 
detail in Estlund (2008) and Peter (2011), but also Marti (2006) and Cerovac (2016) . Many 
valuable insights on this distinction, as well as some new interpretations, can be found in 
Destri (2017) . 
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this end-state is, thus being able to evaluate different decision-making pro-
cedures based on their performance, is to imply that we have already solved 
the society’s knowledge problem . Instead of seeing market and politics as 
means for reaching an already defined and objectively desired end, epistemic 
liberals see them as open-ended creative processes in which what needs to be 
discovered continually changes as a result of citizens acting upon their knowl-
edge (Buchanan and Vanberg 1991) . Of course, Hayek (2002) still holds that 
there are better and worse decision-making procedures (with free market be-
ing clearly superior to central planning), but when we try to evaluate them we 
should not focus on the procedure’s ability to produce some predetermined 
end-state (non-procedural or instrumental epistemic criterion), but by pro-
cedure’s ability to use the relevant knowledge existing within a society (pro-
cedural or intrinsic epistemic criterion) . Different institutional arrangements 
and different decision-making procedures respond differently to the problem 
of the subjective nature of knowledge, widely dispersed among numerous 
citizens in complex societies, and it is in regard of how they make use of this 
knowledge that we evaluate different arrangements and procedures, and not 
in the virtue of their ability to arrive at some predetermined and desired end 
(Tebble 2016) .
This makes epistemic liberals’ position close to Fabienne Peter’s (2011) 
epistemic democracy8, though they clearly disagree regarding many other is-
sues, including the scope of a legitimate democratic government and the role 
of public deliberation . Both positions are also the target of the same objec-
tion: if there is no procedure-independent (epistemic) standard that we can 
appeal to when evaluating different decision-making procedures, we can only 
say that once procedure is better than the other according to that procedure’s 
epistemic standards (Misak 2009, Cerovac 2016b) .
Free Market vs. Public Deliberation
Most scholars who argue that a decision-making procedure’s legitimacy-
generating potential should be (at least in part) grounded in its (intrinsic 
or instrumental) epistemic qualities defend some form of deliberative de-
mocracy (Estlund 2008, Landermore 2013, Marti 2006, Peter 2011, Misak 
2009, Talisse 2009a) . Even scholars who follow Plato (2000) and hold that 
epistemic qualities cannot be realized through a democratic decision-making 
procedure still agree that collective deliberation within a small group of ex-
8 Fabienne Peter defended an anti-instrumentalist position known as pure epistemic pro-
ceduralism (2011) . In her later works (2012, 2015) she abandons this position to opt for 
a more moderate view, building on both procedureal and instrumental epistemic value of 
democracy . 
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perts represents the proper decision-making procedure . Deliberation enables 
us to revise our beliefs in the light of new reasons and evidence, but it also 
gives us the possibility of influencing other citizens and changing their minds 
with the strength of our arguments . It is therefore often considered epistemi-
cally superior to the simple aggregation of individuals’ beliefs or preferences . 
Similarly, it is considered epistemically superior to free market since it enables 
us to critically reflect upon our own preferences and beliefs, as well as upon 
the preferences of others . Resolving many political issues through free market 
leads us to a form of value-subjectivism where beliefs are only acted upon 
without being properly analyzed and evaluated .
Epistemic liberalism is innovative because it rejects the widespread belief 
that collective deliberative procedures are epistemically the best way of resolv-
ing most political issues . There are two arguments that support this claim .
First objection that targets deliberation as a collective decision-making 
procedure emphasizes the subjectivity of economic knowledge . Much of the 
knowledge relevant for the decision-making process does not have a uni-
form, discursive and propositional form that could enable it to be used in 
the process of deliberation . This knowledge is held tacitly and cannot be 
properly shared with others . In fact, sometimes it cannot even be articulated 
in a propositional form . However, since it is embodied in deeply held com-
mitments and values, it still has a strong motivating role and shapes the be-
liefs and preferences of individuals who hold it . Epistemic liberals like Hayek 
(1978, 2012a) and Tebble (2016) thus hold that one of the key epistemic 
advantages of their position is its ability to include tacit knowledge that does 
not have a discursive form in the decision-making process  . Hayek (1978: 
35) emphasizes that “the flow of new ideas springs from the sphere in which 
action, often non-rational action, and material events impinge upon one an-
other”, concluding that “the creative process would dry up if freedom were 
confined to the intellectual sphere” . Epistemic liberalism enables us to use 
this tacit knowledge because it allows us to act upon it on the free market, 
which replaces deliberative (democratic) procedures when dealing with many 
political issues .
Second objection emphasizes the idea that the freedom of (economic) 
action has greater epistemic value than the freedom of thought and liberty 
of conscience . Hayek holds that our ‘beliefs about values do not answer 
to rational argument’ (O’neill 1995, as paraphrased in Tebble 2016), and 
therefore there is little hope that a democratic minority might persuade the 
majority to change its opinion solely on the basis of good arguments9 . The 
epistemic value of deliberation is thus brought in question . Following Mill 
9 Similar ideas are defended by many contemporary psychologists who have conducted 
numerous research projects on this topic . See Haidt (2013) and Mercier and Sperber (2017) . 
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(2008), epistemic liberals believe that, in order to be able to learn from the 
minority and to improve its practices, the society has to secure that all citizens 
have individual liberty to act upon their beliefs . “It is always from a minority 
acting in ways different from what a majority would prescribe that a majority 
in the end learns to do better” (Hayek 1978: 110) . Public deliberation that 
promotes only freedom of thought, speech and press, and simultaneously 
restricts the freedom of economic action is epistemically flawed since it turns 
out to be unable to harvest the knowledge of some citizens, thus delaying the 
society’s overall epistemic progress .
Epistemic liberals therefore reject deliberative democracy as a proper 
decision-making procedure . Deliberation turns out to be unable to resolve 
constantly emerging and changing coordination problems within a complex 
society in a timely and epistemically appropriate manner . Free market in a so-
ciety characterized by equal freedom of economic action is thus seen as an 
epistemically superior decision-making system (or epistemically superior sys-
tem of economic and political coordination) since it is better at resolving the 
knowledge problem within complex societies .
The Scope of Democratic Government
How can free market replace deliberative democracy? It seems one thing to 
say that economy should be built around free market system, without cen-
tral government that regulates investments and transactions, but completely 
another to say that highly contestable issues regarding values, identities and 
culture should be left unregulated and resolved solely by free market mecha-
nisms . Epistemic liberals deny that there is a relevant distinction between the 
two ideas – they opt for ‘a strategy of privatization’ (Barry 2000, as cited in 
Tebble 2016) in both cases, adopting a libertarian position where individuals 
are left to make their own decisions and regulate their relations based on the 
particular pieces of knowledge that they have . The main rationale behind this 
position is the idea that, in complex societies, no centralized authoritative 
decision-making body can take into consideration all the epistemically rele-
vant pieces of fragmented knowledge that is widely dispersed throughout the 
political community . Following Polanyi’s (1998) idea of polycentricity, epis-
temic liberals hold that there is no single formal political public area where 
issues of economy and politics and can be properly addressed . All citizens ad-
dress these issues in their everyday decision-making, and through the process 
of complex cultural adaptation the best practices emerge .
Complex political issues regarding values, identity and culture, includ-
ing the public use of headscarves, slaughter of animals without pre-stunning, 
the contents of the school curriculums, the cultivation and use of genetically 
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modified plants or the use of drugs by the adults, are met by legal silence . 
Epistemic liberals hold that these issues should not be regulated by the state . 
The citizens’ epistemic contribution is not properly used and respected if a 
centralized authoritative body produces decisions that regulate our conduct 
regarding these issues . Since the citizens should be left to decide on their 
own how they want to address the issues in question, the state should only 
ensure that they are properly informed and not directly cheated . For example, 
information regarding whether the food was genetically modified or which 
method of slaughter was used should be clearly labeled on the packing . Free 
market helps us determine which practices better meet the needs and pref-
erences of the citizens, but also the value of the products created by these 
practices .
Some might argue that legal silence promoted by epistemic liberalism 
threatens the interests and the well-being of minorities (Kymlicka 1996) . 
Particular cultural interests of minorities cannot be adequately promoted in 
a free market system . In such cases, state should step in to protect and pro-
mote interests of minority members through subsidizing for the additional 
costs that the promotion of these interests and values requires, or by some 
forms of positive discrimination . Epistemic liberals strongly reject this idea: 
any intervention by the state would have negative impact on the epistemic 
task the free market is performing . The idea of legal silence goes both ways: 
the state should promote or protect neither the majority nor the minority 
view . Consequently, just like the state should not interfere regarding the use 
of headscarves, it should also remain silent regarding the preference of some 
employers to have employees with or without headscarves . Epistemic liberals, 
however, believe that this hardly leads to discrimination against the minori-
ties – in complex societies characterized by free market it is very difficult, if 
not impossible, to know whose interests we have indirectly promoted . As 
Friedman (1982: 26) states, in a free society “no one who buys bread knows 
whether the wheat from which it is made was grown by a Communist or a 
republican, […] or by a negro or a white” .
Conclusion
Epistemic liberalism was a somewhat neglected position for the past few dec-
ades, with supporters of epistemic justification of decision-making proce-
dures opting for deliberative democracy on the one hand, and supporters of 
free market opting for moral (non-epistemic) public justification on the other 
hand . However, the recent work by Tebble (2016), Anderson (2006), Lewis 
(2013) and others suggests that epistemic liberalism may still offer valuable 
insights into many issues of contemporary political philosophy, particularly 
when applied to the problems facing collective decision-making processes in 
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societies characterized by a pluralism of cultural, religious and moral compre-
hensive doctrines . For example, its argument against deliberative democracy, 
based on non-propositional and tacit knowledge, raises some justified worries 
and still has to be properly answered .
Since the position draws inspiration from philosophers whose work 
has been thoroughly discussed for many decades, many of the arguments 
raised against these authors can be modified to target epistemic liberalism . 
An overview of these arguments would require a paper of its own, so only 
the two most important will be sketched in these concluding remarks . First, 
epistemic liberalism requires a somewhat egalitarian distribution of resources 
in order to give every epistemic agent (citizen) chance for roughly equal epis-
temic contribution (Tebble 2016: 66) . However, it seems unclear how can a 
minimal state, one that practices legal science in both economy and politics, 
ensure such a demanding egalitarian distribution of resources and, conse-
quently, chances for epistemic contribution . Second, though epistemic liber-
alism might be able to resolve some conflicts regarding values, identity and 
culture, it fails to adequately address many other moral and political prob-
lems (especially those related to born and unborn children), such as abortion 
or mandatory vaccination . When some start comparing abortion to a murder 
of an adult person (and others disagreeing with this claim), legal silence is 
no longer a viable option . In order to impose itself as a decent alternative to 
epistemic democracy, epistemic liberalism has to answer these and numerous 
other objections .10
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